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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs < 
WELDON S . ABBOTT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Civil No. 15574 
BRIEF IN ANSI-7ER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant-Respondent Abbott submits this brief in 
answer to Plaintiff-Appellant Christensen's petition and brief 
for rehearing. 
OPENING STATEMENT 
Our review of appellant's petition for rehearing and 
brief in support thereof fails to show that this Court in its 
majority opinion did not consider all points on the appeal; 
that there are any newly discovered matters; that this Court 
misconstrued or overlooked any material matters of fact; or, 
that the Court based its decision on any wrong principle of 
law or that it misapplied or overlooked any material matter. 
On the contrary, appellant's redundant complaints go 
to a proliferation of charges of "inferences," "speculations," 
and "unbelievable and unreasonable" constructions and improper 
"deference" by the majority of this Court. 
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Respondent's answer will respond to these charges 
by separat~ points. 
POINT I. 
THE ABBOTT TO CHRISTENSEN l'lOTE HAS AN INTEGRAL PART 
OF THE RANCHING BUSINESS OPERATION 
Appellant complains that the Abbott-Christensen note 
was never any part of the joint venture, and he would limit the 
scope of "joint venture" to the Haslem ranch and the red cattle 
operation, thus fragmenting the whole business and ranching 
operation between the parties. 
\le submit that the note was alleged and proved by 
Ar~0rt -1r:d accepted and believed by the trial court to be one 
fac.o.: of the financing arrangement in operation of the whole 
joint ranching operation. The note (Exhibit P-l) was non-
negotiable. anc'. it .·as i.;1tended to be operable only bet>-Jeen 
Abbott and Christensen. All cattle, black Angus and red Haslem. 
were run together on the Haslem ranch and BU1 lands by 
Christensen, with an agreement between the parties for their 
sharing equally the income from the calf crop (R-50) . Hhen the 
settlement 1-.ras made on April 28, 1976, all of the cattle, black 
and red, were divided equally between the parties, not just 
the Haslem cattle as appellant claims, and Abbott assumed the 
delinquencies on the Haslem ranch mortgage. 
After a two-day trial where the details of the entire 
ranching operation and finances 1-1ere fully examined, Judge 
-2-
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Sorenson stated in his memorandum decision (R-40). 
It would appear that, no matter what the 
business arrangement was between the 
parties prior to Apr~l 28, 1976, on that 
date both parties concluded the business 
had failed, and they therefore settled 
between them a division of the property 
and debts. The court finds that Exhibit 4 
covers only a part of that settlement. 
The court concludes that on April 28, 1976, 
there ~~as an accord and satisfaction, and 
therefore finds no cause of action. 
(emphasis added) 
The trial court's Findings of Fact (R-41) stated that 
the parties were engaged in a "business enterprise"; that the 
the "business venture" failed; and, that on April 28, 1976 the 
parties made a division of the property and debts of their 
"business operation." 
In examining the business enterprise; that is, the 
whole joint ranching operation, the trial court properly re-
ceived and allowed proof and testimony regarding the Abbott 
note as part of the business financing between the parties and 
as part of the final settlement in the accord and satisfaction. 
Appellant called Abbott as his witness, and at that time and 
also later when Abbott testified on direct examination, no 
objection going to the parole evidence rule was ever made by 
Appellant to Abbott's testimony to the effect that the note 
'.vas an integral part of the ~~hole business arrangement and that 
it '~as to be cancelled as part of the final settlement (R-116, 
117, llS, 242, 243). Judge Sorenson stated in his memorandum 
-3-
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opinion (R-40) that the assignment and assumption instr~~ent 
(Exh. P-4) was only a part of the accord and satisfaction 
settlement, and in allowing testimony regarding the intended 
cancellation of the note, the trial court was properin follow-
ing fullfrog !Iarina. Inc. v. Lentz, 28 U.2d 261, 501P.2d 266 
(1972), which case allowed parole evidence to show the whole 
and complete agreement of the parties. 
The trial court accepted as competent and credible 
the testimony of Abbott regarding his clear understanding that 
che joint business arrangement included the running of all 
cattle red and black, that the note '"as an integral part of 
;Jar- ·,2 <V:1ole ·~usiness arrangement: and that cancellation 
of t~e noces was a oart of the whole accord and satisfaction 
settlement. On the apoeal, four justices of this Court, with 
the full record b~fore [ne~. concurred with Judge Sorenson in 
his decision and f~ndings. 
POWT II. 
THE SUPRENE COURT ;[1\DE A FUll REVIEI.J OF lliE 
RECORD NID THE !·1AJORirl CC:,CURRI:D HITII m::: 
TRIAL COURT'S FI:~DnlGS c~E AFTER .-\ THO-DAY TRIAL 
Appellant complains that the ~ajority of the Court 
"infers" facts. 2akes "speculations outside of the record," 
~akes "deference to the trial court to allow the patent in-
justice. fraud or inequitable result," and "perpetuates the 
error of ~!-le trial court," all of which is "unreasonable, 
unconscionable, and unthinkable anc defies all credibility." 
-4-
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On appeal this Court had before it the full record, 
including the transcript of the two-day trial. The trial court 
and four justices ofthis Court accepted the testimony of Abbott 
as competent, credible and believable. 
We submit that appellant tortures the words "infer" 
and "deference." The accepted judicial use of "inference" is 
not as a VJeSS or surmise, but as a logical conclusion and as 
used in Prudential Federal Savings v. nartford Ace. & Ind. Co. 
7 U2d 366, 325 P2d 899 (1958), which states: 
Inasmuch as the trial court found in favor 
of the plaintiffs, they are entitled to have 
us review the evidence and every reasonable 
inference fairly to be drawn therefrom ln the 
light most favoraule to them. (eophasis added) 
Judie ial "deference" is in no >vay blind complaisance, 
but can best be defined in the language of Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co. 
22 U2d 356, 453 P2d 155: 
On appeal we apply the traditional rules 
of review: we assume that the trial court 
believed those aspects of the evidence which 
may be deemed to support his finding and 
judgment; and we survey the evidence in the 
light favorable thereto. 
POINT III. 
ALL CONDUCT OF ABBOTT A.t''!D HIS TESTil10NY WAS 
REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
Appellant complains (1) that because the record shows 
no demand by Abbott for the 200 black cattle awarded to him 
after the settlement, therefore he was not sincere in claiming 
that the note was to be cancelled as part of the settlement; 
-5-
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(2) that it Abbott's testimony had been excluded by the trial 
court, then the note could not be inferred to be a part of the 
whole business arrangement; and, (3) that the reference to the 
trial court's findings and decision perpetuates an "unjust, 
harsh, cruel and debacling result to Christensen." 
Any lack of showing in the record of subsequent demand 
by Abbott for his 200 black cattle goes to the continuing con-
troversy as to which party should pay for the care of those 
cattle after the date of settlement, April 28, 1976. The trial 
court decided that the note was part of the whole business 
.cT·· ·L'.'·f3ent and '"as one facet of the '"hole settlement by accord 
and satisfaction on the basis of competent evidence and cred-
ible testimony. The question of Abbott's failure to demand 
the cattle imrJedi2c~~:· after the settlement "'as not raised in 
the trial, nor on appeal, by appellant. Consideration of such 
fact should be barred now by the ruling of State v. Gandee, 537 
P2d 1064 (1978), where Justice Crockett said: 
The invariably accepted rule of appellate 
review is that no issue will be considered 
by the appellate court unless it was pro-
perly raised in the lower court in order 
to give the parties and the court notice 
and fair opportunity to meet, consider and 
pass upon that issue. 
The question of care for the cattle after date of 
settlement was remanded by this Court and will be further 
litigated. Abbott in no way acquiesed in Christensen's keeping 
the 200 black cattle awarded to Abbott. The record shows that 
-6-
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Christensen proceeded by Order to Show Cause (R-16) to enforce 
an agistor's lien, asking sale of the black cattle and their 
calves The parties thereafter stipulated that those cattle 
should be sold under the direction of Abbott, with the sale 
proceeds to be deposited in a joint bank account and to be re-
leased only on order of the Court (R-35). The sale was made 
and the proceeds of sale were deposited in such joint bank 
account. The judgment of the trial Court (R-43) awarded the 
proceeds of the bank account to Abbott. 
Appellant speculates as to what the result would 
have been if Abbott's testimony regarding the note had been 
excluded. The fact is that the trial court properly allowed 
that testimony following the Bullfrog Marina, Inc. case, supra. 
Appellant complains of the net dollar effect of the 
judgment on Christensen, claiming "shocking unfairness and gross 
disparity," with a result that "is unjust, unreasonable, un-
conscionable and defies all credibility." 
The record shows a two-day trial, with Judge ~orenson 
and on appeal with four justices of this Court accepting the 
testimony of Abbott as competent, substantial and credible to 
show that the note was a vital part of the whole business 
arrangement; that the note was intended to be cancelled; that 
the assignment and assumption instrument was only a part of 
the settlement; and that there was a valid accord and satisfac-
tion agreement between the parties, with good consideration for 
that settlement. 
-7-
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POINT IV. 
TilE TRIAL COURT HAD BEFORE IT COHPETENT, CREDIBLE 
PROOF OF SATISFACTION OF THE ABBOTT NOTE 
Appellant complains that "reasonable men would surely 
conclude" that Christensen ~vould not have assented to cancelling 
the Abbott note as part of the accord and satisfaction in settle· 
ment of the ranching operation, and he cites Tates, Inc. v. 
Little America Refining Co., 535 P2d 1228 (1975). Respondent 
cited the Tates case (Res. Br. 9,10) to show that the party 
asserting the accord and satisfaction has the burden of proof 
ro show an asreement in settlement. 
The two-day trial 1vas entirely devoted to proofs by 
respondent and rebuttal by appellant of respondent's allega-
tion of accor:i ar,..'. satisfaction. The trial court's finding, 
after hearing all o:>: the evidence, vras that there was an accord 
and satisfaction agreement betvreen the parties (R-40) , thus 
concluding that respondent had met his burden of proof. If 
there were any variances in the evidence. the trial court 
weighed all of that evidence and the credibility of the wit-
nesses in finding for respondent. On the appeal, with the full 
record before them, the majority of this Court concurred vrith 
the trial court's assessment of all of the evidence. This 
Court did not have to "defer" to the trial court. This Court 
reviewed the testimony of the parties and four justices agreed 
with the trial judge in acceoting Abbott's testimony as cred-
ible, competent and believable. 
-8-
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant's petition and brief for rehearing show 
nothing new, overlooked or misconstrued in fact or law. The 
full record and the transcript of the two day trial were 
reviewed by this Court in determining that the trial court 
was correct in its findings of fact and its application of 
the lavJ. 
Appellant's petition for rehearing should be denied. 
/ 
I 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wa lace . Hur 
Respondent 
-9-
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